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TITLE IX: WOMEN'S COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
IN LIMBO
Men's intercollegiate football and basketball are among the largest
revenue-producing spectator sports in the United States.' In contrast,
women's college athletics enjoy relatively little popular or monetary
support.2 Nonetheless, in the past decade the number of women par-
ticipating in collegiate sports programs and the money expended in sup-
port of women's athletics have increased dramatically.' The main
legislative impetus behind the increased emphasis on women's sports is
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX),4 which pro-
hibits any federally funded education program from discriminating on
the basis of gender.' The uncertainty of Title IX's continuing impact on
collegiate athletic programs threatens the further growth of women's
FoRBES, March 1, 1982, vol. 129, no. 5, at 16. For the years 1982-1985 college football
had contracted through its governing body, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA), to earn $281.2 million from national television broadcasting rights alone during the
period. Id. A recent federal district court ruling, however, found that the contracts for the
broadcasting rights to college football games formed between the NCAA and the national
broadcasting networks could not be enforced. University of Oklahoma v. National Collegiate
Athletic Assoc., 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1311 (W.D. Okla. 1982). In University of Oklahoma, the
court ruled that the broadcasting contracts violated antitrust laws in forbidding individual
universities to sell the rights to their own football games. Id. at 1323. The ruling, if ultimately
upheld, potentially could permit the major college football programs to earn millions more
dollars in television revenue. Wash. Post, Sept. 23, 1982, at El, col. 1. Until the courts reach
a final decision in the case, the current broadcasting contracts will remain in effect. Id.
2 SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 26, 1982, vol. 57, no. 4, at 11-12. In July, 1982, the combined
budgets of women's athletic departments across the nation equalled approximately sixteen
per cent of the combined budgets of men's athletic departments. Id.
Id. The number of member schools in the Association of Intercollegiate Athletics for
Women (AIAW), which was the controlling body of women's collegiate athletics, rose from
280 in 1971 to 971 in 1982. Id.; see infra note 8 (AIAW superceded by NCAA). In addition,
the expenditures of women's athletic departments rose from one percent of the men's
budgets in 1971 to sixteen per cent in 1982. Id.; see supra note 2 (women's athletic budgets
sixteen per cent of men's in 1982).
20 U.S.C. § 1681-1686 (1976).
5 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). Section 901 of Title IX provides that any educational pro-
gram or activity that receives federal financial assistance shall not discriminate against
anyone on the basis of gender. Id. Subsequent to the general proscription against gender
discrimination, section 901 enumerates specific educational institutions exempted from the
law's strictures. Id. Exempted from Title IX's prohibitions are educational institutions that
traditionally admit members of only one sex, institutions that train individuals for military
service, and institutions under the control of religious organizations whose compliance with
Title IX would violate religious tenets. Id. The section additionally provides a schedule for
compliance with Title IX for traditionally single-sex institutions that change from the pro-
cess of admitting members of only one sex to tlhe admission of members of both sexes. Id.
Section 901 also exempts groups such as single-sex fraternities and soroities and other
oiganizations such as the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts from Title IX. Id. Section 901 defines
the term "educational institution" for the purpose of Title IX as any public or private pre-
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
college sports.' If courts find that Title IX does not proscribe gender
discrimination in college sports programs, no currently recognized
federal controls requiring significant expenditures for women's athletics
will remain.' Without governmental restraints, colleges are unlikely to
continue to increase the amounts of money appropriated to women's
athletics.8
The applicability of Title IX to collegiate athletic programs initially
depends upon whether the language of Title IX limits the law's applica-
tion to certain federally supported education programs.' Opponents of a
broad application of Title IX favor a strict reading of the law, known as
the "program-specific" approach to Title IX.1" The program-specific
school, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution of vocational, professional, or
higher education. Id. If an institution is composed of more than one school, college, or
department, however, the term refers to each separate school, college, or department. Id.
Section 902 of Title IX details the enforcement provisions that the law makes available
to federal agencies empowered to extend federal financial assistance to educational pro-
grams or activities. Id. § 1682. The only express enforcement procedure extended to federal
agencies in section 902 is the termination of continuing federal financial assistance to pro-
grams or activities not in compliance with Title IX. Id. Section 902 permits a termination of
federal funds, however, only after the federal department or agency has advised the institu-
tion that the school is not in compliance with Title IX and the department or agency has
determined that that institution will not voluntarily comply with the law. Id. Section 903
provides for federal judicial review of department or agency action taken under section 902.
Id. § 1683. Subsequent sections of Title IX proscribe discrimination against the blind,
describe Title IX's effect on other laws, and provide for the maintenance of separate living
facilities for the different sexes in compliance with Title IX. Id. §§ 1684, 1685, 1686.
' See infra text accompanying notes 13 & 14 ("program-specific" interpretation of
Title IX would lead to the law's inapplicability to athletic programs).
' See infra text accompanying note 113 (civil rights actions have previously not pro-
vided sufficient protection for women athletes).
' The NCAA, the major force resisting Title IX, has assured Title IX proponents and
women athletes that the NCAA opposes the application of the law to collegiate athletics
solely because of the drastic means by which Title IX attempts to achieve equality of the
sexes. See Koch, Title IX and the NCAA, 3 W. ST. L. Rav. 250, 251 (1976) (gender equality
in collegiate athletics should be achieved through internal NCAA efforts, not statutory law).
The NCAA claims to favor equality of opportunity in intercollegiate athletics. Id. The lack
of advancement in women's athletics before the passage of Title IX and the NCAA's in-
terest in protecting men's football and basketball from any possible cutback in funding
make the NCAA's assurances less than convincing. The concern over the future of women's
collegiate sports heightened with the absorption of the AIAW by the NCAA. See SPORTS IL-
LUSTRATED, July 26, 1982, vol. 57, no. 4, at 11-12. The AIAW controlled women's inter-
collegiate athletics for eleven years before the association's demise. Id. The lack of an
organization that will speak exclusively for women athletes endangers the ability of women
to control their own athletic programs in the future. Id. The AIAW, however, now is
challenging the NCAA's holding of championships in women's sports. Wash. Post, Oct. 21,
1982, at E3, col. 6. The AIAW contends that the NCAA is violating federal antitrust laws.
Id.
, See Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics Are Outside HEW's Jurisdiction, 65
GEo. L.J. 49, 62 (1976) (language of Title IX forbids its application to collegiate athletic pro-
grams).
10 See id. (Title IX not applicable unless program receives direct federal assistance).
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theory of Title IX would limit the law's application solely to programs
that receive direct federal financial assistance.' The program-specific
theory is in direct opposition to the "institutional" interpretation of Title
IX, which provides that any educational institution that receives any
federal aid must comply in every program with Title IX" A strict
program-specific application of Title IX would endanger the Department
of Education's ability to force compliance with Title IX in collegiate
athletic departments, since virtually no college sports programs receive
direct federal financial assistance.'3 Thus, if courts apply Title IX on a
program-specific basis, sexual discrimination in college sports will be
beyond the direct reach of Title IX's sanctions.'4
Proponents of the program-specific approach find support for their
interpretation of the law in section 901 of Title IX, which prohibits
gender discrimination in any education program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance." The law appears to contain expressly
program-specific language." As a result of the limiting language of Title
The term "program-specific" derives from the language of Title IX, which proscribes gender
discrimination in "any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance."
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). Federal financial assistance consists of a number of different federal
grants. 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(g) (1979). Federal aid that meets the Title IX definition of federal
financial assistance may include loans or grants of federal assistance made available for
building or repairing facilities, or loans or grants made available for scholarships, or grants
or loans made available to students. Id. In addition, federal financial assistance may consist
of grants of federal real or personal property to an institution, the provision of federal ser-
vices to an institution, the sale of government property to an institution for a nominal con-
sideration, or any other contract made with an institution that has as a purpose the provis-
ion of assistance to any education program or activity. Id.
H See Koch, supra note 8, at 521 (language of Title IX limits the law's application to
programs that receive direct federal aid).
12 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (1981). The Department of Education regulations promulgated
with regard to Title IX's effect on athletic programs provide that there shall be no
discrimination on the basis of gender at any level of athletic competition at a "recipient" in-
stitution. Id. The regulations define a recipient as any institution to which the federal
government extends financial assistance directly or through another recipient and which
operates an education program or activity that receives or benefits from the assistance. Id.,
§ 106.2(h). Thus, the regulations apply to every sport in which a college or university par-
ticipates regardless of whether the institution's athletic program directly receives financial
aid. Id., § 106.2.
" See University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 323 (E.D. Va. 1982). Most col-
lege athletic programs receive their revenues through ticket sales from revenue-producing
sports, alumni contributions, and general university funds. See Hearings on Title IX Before
the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1975) (remarks of Darrell Royal, President of the American Foot-
ball Coaches Association, head coach, University of Texas) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
In fact, attorneys for the government have stated that only one-half of one per cent of col-
legiate athletic programs receive direct federal financial assistance through funds to build
gymnasiums. Wash. Post, Sept. 9, 1982, at A23, col. 1.
" See supra note 8 (without federal controls continued advancements in collegiate
sports for women are unlikely).
" 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). See supra note 5 (text of Title IX).
" See supra note 4 (language of Title IX program-specific).
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IX, proponents of a program-specific interpretation argue that statutory
construction demands a program-specific reading of Title IX. 7 Pro-
ponents of a limited interpretation maintain that to give the law any
other reading would destroy congressional intent and give Title IX a
meaning and scope that Congress arguably did not intend in enacting the
law. 8
In addition to the language of the law, the legislative history of Title
IX also supports the program-specific theory.'9 Although the original
version of Title IX expressly embodied an institutional approach,' the
adopted version of the law contains program-specific language." Pro-
ponents of the program-specific approach argue that Congress' substitu-
tion of a program-specific application for the institutional approach in-
dicates congressional intent to limit applicability of Title IX.' Further-
more, some areas of Title IX other than gender discrimination are clearly
institutional,' which program-specific proponents view as indicative of
Congress' recognition of the differences between the institutional and
program-specific limitations to the prohibitions against gender
discrimination.24
17 See Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 79-80 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(regulations attempting broader enforcement than statute under which regulations are pro-
mulgated are invalid).
16 See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974) (agency decision under statute should be
overturned if not consistent with congressional intent); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S.
86, 94-95 (1973) (incorrect agency interpretation of statute should not be followed); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (courts need not defer to administrative
construction of statute where agency interpretation clearly is wrong).
19 See Kuhn, supra note 9, at 64-65 (Congress intended Title IX to be program-specific).
See infra text accompanying notes 20-22 (legislative history of Title IX indicates conscious
intent to adopt program-specific version of the law). But see infra text accompanying note
33 (institutional approach also may draw support from Title IX's legislative history).
" 117 CONG. REC. 30156 (1971). The original Senate version of Title IX, which Senator
Bayh of Indiana proposed, prohibited gender discrimination "under any program or activity
conducted by a public institution ... which is a recipient of Federal financial assistance." Id.
The Senate, however, rejected Sen. Bayh's original version of the law. Id.
2'1 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). See supra text accompanying note 5 (language of adopted
version of Title IX program-specific).
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) (present version of Title IX contains program-specific
language); see Kuhn, supra note 9, at 64-65 (change in language of adopted draft of Title IX
indicates conscious congressional intent to adopt program-specific approach to the law).
Courts that have ruled that Title IX is program-specific with regard to gender discrimina-
tion often have emphasized the difference in the two versions of Title IX when examining
the law's legislative history. See infra text accompanying notes 44-46 (courts rule Congress
intended program-specific scope of Title IX). Generally, a change in the form of a law will in-
dicate specific congressional intent. C. SANDS, 2A SUTHERLAND'S STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 48.18 at 224 (4th Ed. 1973).
- 20 U.S.C. § 1684 (1976). When dealing with educational discrimination against per-
sons with impaired vision, Congress adopted a specifically institutional approach. Id. Sec-
tion 904 of Title IX provides that no recipient of federal financial assistance shall deny ad-
mission to any course of study on the ground of blindness. Id.
Z, See Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376,1382-83 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (Title
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The program-specific theory directly contravenes the official Depart-
ment of Education interpretation of Title IX,' the institutional ap-
proach." Under an institutional application of Title IX, any educational
institution that receives federal assistance must comply in every uni-
versity program with Title IX, regardless of whether the aid is ear-
marked specifically for use by that program.' Consequently, an institu-
tional application of Title IX would proscribe gender discrimination in
the athletic program of a college or university that receives federal aid. 8
Virtually all colleges or universities receive some type of federal finan-
cial assistance.'
Legislative history also supports the institutional interpretation of
Title IX20 Since the original enactment of Title IX, Congress has made
several attempts to amend Title IX specifically to exclude inter-
collegiate athletic programs or to limit coverage of Title IX to programs
or activities that receive direct federal funding.2 All of the amendments
IX must be given program-specific scope due to legislative history); infra text accompanying
notes 42-45 (Othen court ruled Title IX to be program-specific); see also infra note 46 (other
courts that have adopted the limiting view of Title IX's legislative history).
34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (1981). Section 301(a)(3) of the Department of Education Organiza-
tion Act transferred HEW's enforcement and administrative functions under Title IX to the
Department of Education. 20 U.S.C. § 3441(a)(3) (1976 Supp. IV). HEW originally obtained
Title IX's enforcement and administrative functions under Title IX. See North Haven
Board of Education v. Bell, __ U.S. .. 72 L. Ed. 2d 299, 305 (1982).
Statutory construction generally requires courts to view with deference agency inter-
pretive regulations. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); NLRB v.
Seven-Up Corp., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1952); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1932).
' See supra note 12 (regulations promulgated under Title IX are institutional).
" 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (1981).
, See infra text accompanying notes 89 & 91 (federal aid may be in form of student
grants and still force compliance with Title IX).
' See infra text accompanying note 89 (schools that attempt to remain free from
federal regulation by consciously not accepting federal aid still deemed to receive federal
financial assistance through federal grants to students).
Haffer v. Temple University, 524 F. Supp. 531, 534-35 (E.D. Pa. 1981). See infra note
31 (failure of Congress to pass amendments to Title IX indicates intent to retain institu-
tional version). See also supra text accompanying note 19 (program-specific approach also
draws support from Title IX's legislative history).
"' Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: HEW gets Serious About Equality in
Sports?, 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 573, 576 (1980). Senator Tower of Texas twice attempted to
amend Title IX by excluding revenue producing college sports. 120 CONG. REC. 15322 (1974);
121 CONG. REC. 22775 (1975). The first attempt died in conference, the Senate defeated the
second. Amend. 1343 to S. 1539, 120 CONG. REC. 15322 (1974; S. 2106, 121 CONG. REC. 22775
(1975). Senator Helms of North Carolina twice attempted to limit Title IX and the HEW
regulations to programs and activities that receive direct federal assistance. 121 CONG. REC.
17300 (1975); 121 CONG. REC. 23845 (1975). The first attempt was not reported out of commit-
tee. S. CONG. R. 46, 121 CONG. REC. 17300 (1975). Congress defeated the second. S. 2146, 121
CONG. RaC. 23845 (1975). Senator McClure also attempted to amend Title IX to limit the law
to programs that receive direct federal aid. 122 CONG. REC. 28136 (1976); 122 CONG. REC.
28144 (1976). Both attempts failed. Amend. 389, 122 CONG. REC. 28136 (1976); Amend. 390,
122 CONG. REc. 28144 (1976).
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failed.2 Thus, since attempts to limit the scope of Title IX by amend-
ment have failed, proponents of the institutional approach maintain that
courts must give Title IX an expansive reading so that the law will
achieve the goals that Congress intended.' In addition, proponents of
the institutional approach argue that Congress' failure to pass a resolu-
tion disapproving of the Department of Education's institutional regula-
tions indicates an implicit acknowledgment that the regulations are con-
sistent with Congress' intended application of Title IX. 4
The ambiguous legislative history concerning the scope of Title IX
has resulted in an inconsistent application of the law in the federal
courts. 5 The Department of Education's official interpretation of Title
IX as institutional with regard to gender discrimination,36 has heightened
the confusion surrounding Title IX's effect on collegiate athletic pro-
grams, 7 since courts must view an administrative agency's interpreta-
tion of a statute with deference. 8 Despite the official Department of
Education position favoring the institutional application of Title IX, re-
cent federal court decisions indicate growing support for the program-
specific limitation of Title IX's prohibition of gender discrimination. 9
I See supra note 31 (all attempts to amend Title IX in Congress have failed). The re-
jection of an amendment generally indicates that the legislature does not intend a different
interpretation of a statute than the current construction given by the administrative agency
in control of the statute's administration. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 294, 305-06 (1933).
1 See United States v. Zazove, 334 U.S. 602, 610 (1948) (statutes should be liberally
construed to effectuate congressional intent).
Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 535-36 (E.D. Pa. 1981); affd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d
Cir. 1982); see Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 412-13 (1962) (congressional inaction after court
interpretation of statute indicates acquiescence to agency interpretation); Alstate Construc-
tion Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13, 16-17 (1953) (congressional failure to amend statute to curb
administrative agency's power viewed as indicative of Congress' continued authorization of
agency's control). Title IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which pro-
hibited racial discrimination in federally funded programs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-6 (1978);
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979). Civil rights statutes such as Title
VI and Title IX are entitled to broad interpretation to facilitate the remedial purposes of
the statutes. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7. Courts have found Title VI to be institutional in
nature. See Haffer, 524 F. Supp. at 537.
1 See infra text accompanying notes 46 & 48 (some courts ruling Title IX program-
specific while other find the law to institutional).
- 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (1981).
' See infra text accompanying note 102 (diametrically opposing court decisions on Ti-
tle IX reflect current confusion surrounding the law).
See Thorpe v. Hous. Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969) (reviewing court must grant
deference to administrative agency's interpretation of regulations); see also supra note 25
(courts must treat administrative interpretation of statute with deference). But see supra
text accompanying note 18 (courts must reject administrative construction of statute that
exceeds congressional intent).
' See Rice v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 338 (1st Cir.
1981) (receipt of federal funds by law school for specific programs such as work-study
created no Title IX claim for woman who could not identify a specific federally funded pro-
gram in which she suffered gender discrimination), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ , 102 S.
[Vol. 40:297
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A federal district court in Michigan supported the program-specific
limitation of Title IX in Othen v. Ann Arbor School Board.0 In Othen, a
female high school student sought a permanent injunction prohibiting
sexual discrimination on the school's golf team.41 The Othen court initially
acknowledged the history of sexual discrimination in the United States
and the need to provide women with an equal opportunity in all aspects
of life, including athletics.42 Nonetheless, the Othen court held the
regulations adopted under Title IX invalid since the regulations codified
an institutional application of Title IX." Focusing on the change in
language between the initial Title IX draft and the final form of the
law," the Othen court held that the "clear language" of Title IX required
a program-specific application of the law. 5 Several other federal decis-
ions have supported the Othen court in finding Title IX to be program-
specific with regard to gender discrimination.46
Several federal courts, however, relying on the Department of
Education's interpretation of Title IX," have supported the institutional
application of the law to athletic programs.48 In Haffer v. Temple Uni-
versity," for example, Temple University sought summary judgment in
Ct. 1976 (1982); Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 80 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(female athletes' claims of gender discrimination not actionable under Title IX when uni-
versity's athletic program received no direct federal aid); Jacobs v. College of William and
Mary, 517 F. Supp. 791, 798 (E.D. Va. 1980) (claim of employment discrimination against col-
lege athletic department not actionable under Title IX), affd, 661 F.2d 922 (4th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1033 (1982); see also infra text accompanying notes 45, 46 & 78 (other
decisions following program-specific application of Title IX).
40 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
Id. at 1378.
42 Id. at 1379. The Othen court acknowledged a court's duty to try to grant female
athletes the same opportunities available to male athletes. Id. The Othen court, however,
noted that a court may ensure equal opportunities are available only when the questions
presented are within the framework of power assigned to the judicial branch of the govern-
ment. Id.
s Id. at 1381.
" Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 20-22 (program-specific interpretation of
legislative history of Title IX focuses on difference in language between original version
and adopted draft of law).
11 507 F. Supp. at 1381. In addition to finding Title IX program-specific, the Othen
court ruled that a program which benefits from indirect federal assistance does not fall
within the purview of Title IX. Id. The Othen court stated that Title IX applies only to a
program that receives direct federal financial assistance. Id. But see Grove City College v.
Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 697-98 (3rd Cir. 1982) (every program at an institution that receives
general federal aid through grants to students indirectly benefits from the aid and therefore
Title IX applies to all the school's programs).
"' See supra note 39 (other courts holding Title IX to be program-specific).
" See supra note 12 (regulations under Title IX adopt institutional approach).
See Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14, 17 (3rd Cir. 1982) (Title IX controls uni-
versity athletic program due to university's receipt of general federal aid); Grove City Col-
lege v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 697 (3d Cir. 1982) (federal grants given to college athletes suffi-
cient to bring college under Title IX guidelines).
11 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affd, 688 F.2d 14 (3rd Cir. 1982).
1983]
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an action that women students instituted for Title IX violations in the
operation of the school's athletic departments. Temple based its motion
on a program-specific reading of Title IX. The Eastern District Court of
Pennsylvania denied the motion for summary judgment, adopting the in-
stitutional interpretation of the legislative history of Title IX. 2 The Haf-
fer court ruled that Title IX prohibits gender discrimination in college
athletic departments whenever the school receives substantial federal
aid, regardless of whether the athletic program receives federal funds."
The Haffer court based the decision on an expansive reading of the
phrase "receiving federal financial assistance" in Title IX. 4 The court
found that Temple's receipt of over nineteen million dollars in federal
financial aid supported the conclusion that every program in the uni-
versity benefitted from the receipt of federal money and thus fell under
the Title IX guidelines.' 5 As an alternative to the institutional approach,
the Haffer court held that even if a court must give Title IX a program-
specific interpretation, the Temple athletic program still would be sub-
ject to Title IX since the department's employees and athletes received
substantial assistance through various federal financial programs. 6 The
Haffer court found case law support in Iron Arrow Honor Society v.
Schweiker In Iron Arrow the Fifth Circuit upheld the right of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to terminate
federal aid to the University of Miami for supporting an all-male
honorary society. The Iron Arrow court held that the recognition which
524 F. Supp. at 532.
" Id. In Haffer, Temple University relied on the Othen and Bennett cases in arguing
that Title IX was program-specific when applied to college athletic programs. Id. at 537; see
Othen, 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1382; Bennett, 525 F. Supp. 77, 79-80; see also supra note 39
(courts holding Title IX to be program-specific). The Temple athletic department received
no direct federal funding. 524 F. Supp. at 532.
52 524 F. Supp. at 533; see supra text accompanying notes 31-34 (failure to amend Title
IX indicative of congressional intent to apply Title IX institutionally).
524 F. Supp. at 533.
Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976)).
55 Id. at 539. The Haffer court found support for the "benefit" interpretation of the
term "receiving federal aid" from the Title VI civil rights cases, which adopted the institu-
tional approach. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 34 (Title VI cases support institu-
tional reading of Title IX).
1 524 F. Supp. at 540. The federal government paid 80% of the wages of over 50 part-
time and several full-time employees of the Temple athletic department through the
federally funded College Work-Study Program, 42 U.S.C. § 2571 (1973). 524 F. Supp. at 540.
Intercollegiate athletes at Temple also received several hundred thousand dollars each year
in federal financial aid. Id.
, 652 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated, __ U.S. __, 102 S. Ct. 3475 (1982); see
text accompanying notes 69-72 infra (Iron Arrow reversed in light of subsequent Supreme
Court decisions). In Iron Arrow, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
sought to terminate the federal funds provided to the University of Miami due to the
presence of the all-male Iron Arrow Honor Society. 652 F.2d at 446. The University sought
an injunction against the HEW to forbid the termination of federal funds. Id.
" 652 F.2d at 448. The Iron Arrow Society, which the first president of the University
[Vol. 40:297
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the University gave the society, combined with evidence of tangible sup-
port that the University furnished to Iron Arrow, constituted "substan-
tial assistance" to the society. 9 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the
University's substantial assistance encouraged the society's gender
discrimination policies, thus violating Title IX and mandating a
withdrawal of federal financial assistance."
The Supreme Court first considered the scope of Title IX in North
Haven Board of Education v. Bell." In North Haven the Court con-
sidered the validity of the HEW regulations on gender discrimination in
employment in educational institutions.2 The Title IX employment
regulations, like the regulations governing athletics, are institutional in
approach, which has led several federal courts to invalidate the employ-
ment regulations.' In North Haven, two Connecticut state school boards
filed suit seeking to invalidate the employment regulations.64 The boards
filed the suits in response to actions that female employees of the school
boards instituted alleging gender discrimination in hiring and job
assignments. 5 The North Haven Court held that the statutory language
of Title IX clearly is program-specific in the sections that proscribe
of Miami established, was the only campus group to receive a charter from the university.
Id. at 447.
11 Id. at 447-448. Evidence that the University of Miami furnished support to Iron Ar-
row included the school's alumni association providing mailing and postage for Iron Arrow
material, secretarial support that the school made available to Iron Arrow, the University's
finance office's handling of three society accounts, and the maintenance of a private room
for the society in the school's student union building. Id.
I Id. at 448. In addition to finding that Iron Arrow had indirectly received assistance
sufficient to bring the society under Title IX, the Fifth Circuit ruled that even if Iron Arrow
had received no tangible aid from the University, the University nonetheless provided
"substantial assistance" to the society. Id. The Iron Arrow court concluded that substantial
assistance was present since the society could not exist without the school. Id.
Several other federal court decisions also support a broader reading of Title IX. See,
e.g., Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 793-94 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (antidiscrimination
policy against physical handicaps is institutional in scope); Grove City College v. Harris, 500
F. Supp. 253, 257 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (students' receipt of federally funded education grants suf-
ficient to bring school under Title IX), affd, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982); Bob Jones Univ. v.
Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 601 (D. S.C. 1974) (university is recipient of federal funds subject
to Title IX civil rights action where sole federal aid received was veterans' educational
benefits paid to some students), affd. mee., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
e _ - U.S. __ , 72 L. Ed. 2d 299, 303 (1982).
2__ U.S. at _ _, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 307.
_____ U.S. at __ . n.9, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 307 n.9; see supra note 38 (courts in-
validate regulations not consistent with Title IX); see also Dougherty County School
System v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 737-38 (5th Cir. 1980) (agency regulations concerning em-
ployment discrimination promulgated under Title IX were invalid since Title IX is program-
specific, but Title IX upheld as permitting the regulation of some employment practices),
vacated, - U.S. - , 102 S. Ct. 1164 (1982); see 45 C.F.R. § 86.51 (1981) (Title IX agency
regulations on gender discrimination in employment).
- U.S. at __ , 72 L. Ed. 2d at 305-06.
Id. at __, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 306.
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gender discrimination and provide enforcement of the proscription."
The Court's determination that Congress specifically intended to pro-
hibit gender discrimination in employment in federally funded education
programs in adopting Title IX, however, rendered dicta the Court's
program-specific interpretation of Title IX."' Furthermore, the North
Haven Court upheld HEW's regulations as consistent with the program-
specific scope of Title IX and thus found the regulations valid.'
The uncertainty of the North Haven decision's effect on Title IX
areas other than employment discrimination compounded when the
Supreme Court vacated in a memorandum opinion the Fifth Circuit's
judgment in Iron Arrow.9 The Court remanded the case to the Fifth Cir-
cuit for further considerations in light of the North Haven decision."h
Since the Fifth Circuit relied on an institutional application of Title IX in
Iron Arrow in ruling that Title IX forbade the honor society from admit-
ting only males," the Supreme Court's decision suggests that the Court
intends to apply Title IX with a program-specific approach in all areas. 2
6 Id. at _ _, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 303-04. The North Haven Court did not examine the
legislative history of Title IX in finding the law to be program-specific. Id. The Supreme
Court relied solely on the language of Title IX in determining the scope of the law. Id. The
Court long has held that where the meaning of a statute is clear on its face, a court should
not interpret the law in a way different from the plain meaning expressed. United States v.
Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 619 (1954) (plain meaning of law must be adhered to); Central Bank v.
United States, 345 U.S. 639, 646 (1953) (court must not give interpretation to statute other
than that which Congress clearly intended).
67 __ U.S. at __, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 309-14. The North Haven Court engaged in a
lengthy examination of the legislative history of Title IX in determining whether Congress
intended the law to control gender discrimination in institutional employment procedures.
Id.
, Id. at __ , 72 L. Ed. 2d at 318; see supra text accompanying note 66 (Title IX
given program-specific scope). The North Haven Court conceded that the Title IX employ-
ment regulations were ambiguous and arguably attempted to control the employment prac-
tices of an institution that received federal aid. __ U.S. at __ , 72 L. Ed. 2d at 318.
The Supreme Court nonetheless ruled that the regulations were consistent with a program-
specific approach, since the regulations forbid employment discrimination on the basis of
sex in "any education program or activity" receiving federal aid. Id. at __, 72 L. Ed. 2d
at 318, 319 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (1980)).
69 __ U.S. __ , 102 S. Ct. 3475 (1982).
70 Id.
71 652 F.2d 445, 448 (5th Cir. 1981). See supra text accompanying note 60 (university
support of all-male society amounted to institution's fostering gender discrimination).
72 652 F.2d at 448. See infra text accompanying notes 79-80 (later decision interpreting
Iron Arrow as demanding program-specific application of Title IX). In addition to the in-
stitutional reading of Title IX, the Fifth Circuit in Iron Arrow relied on a statement by the
Secretary of HEW that stated that Title IX applies to programs which indirectly benefit
from federal aid. 652 F.2d at 446 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing 39 Fed. Reg, 22229 (1974)). Thus, the
Supreme Court's decision in Iron Arrow also may be an invalidation of the benefit theory.
See __ U.S. __ , 102 S. Ct. 3475, 3475 (1982). The fact that the four Justices (Bren-
nan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun) who dissented in the Iron Arrow decision composed
the majority (along with Justices Stevens and O'Connor) in North Haven adds to the confus-
ion that the issuance of a mere memorandum opinion in Iron Arrow creates. See id.
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The strict program-specific approach that the Supreme Court ap-
parently adopted in North Haven and Iron Arrow formed the basis of
the decision in University of Richmond v. Bell,73 the first decision after
North Haven to rule on the applicability of Title IX to collegiate
athletics."4 The Eastern District of Virginia in University of Richmond
rejected the Department of Education's interpretation of Title IX as in-
stitutional.75 Instead, the University of Richmond court ruled that the
University of Richmond's athletic department did not have to comply
with Title IX with respect to gender discrimination, thus adopting the
program-specific interpretation of Title IX.78 The University. of Rich-
mond court held that although the North Haven decision may prohibit a
court from striking down Title IX regulations on gender discrimination,
North Haven also established the program'specific interpretation of the
regulations." Thus, the University of Richmond court held that the
Department of Education's institutional approach, which the Title IX
regulations manifested, was invalid, and ruled'the Department of Educa-
tion could not attempt to regulate the university's athletic program."
The University of Richmond court also found that the benefit or substan-
tial assistance theory that the Haffer court supported could not bring
the University of Richmond's athletic program within the scope of Title
IX.79 The University of Richmond court reasoned that the benefit theory
actually is another form of the institutional approach to Title IX, and
therefore no longer is valid due to the Supreme Court's ruling in North
Haven.80
Despite the University of Richmond court's rejection of the benefit
theory, other courts have embraced the benefit theory as a means of bring-
543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982).
7' Id. at 324.
7 Id. at 327.
7 Id. The University of Richmond case arose out of a request by the Office of Civil
Rights for information concerning the school's athletic program and the University's com-
pliance with Title IX. Id. at 323. Instead of issuing an assurance of compliance, however, the
University challenged the office's ability to force compliance with Title IX. Id. The University
contended that since the school's athletic program received no direct federal aid, compliafice
with Title IX was voluntary due to a program-specific interpretation of Title IX. Id.
7 Id. at 327; see supra text accompanying note 66 (Title IX's language demands
program-specific application).
78 543 F. Supp. at 327.
Id. at 328-29. The Department of Education argued that the University of Rich-
mond court should apply the benefit theory that the district court in Haffer and the Fifth
Circuit in Iron Arrow previously applied. Id. at 327; see supra text accompanying notes 55
& 59 (Haffer and Iron Arrow courts adopting benefit theory application of Title IX). The
Department of Education contended that federal aid furnished to the university, which
helped build dormitories and dining halls that the school's athletes used, constituted federal
financial assistance to the athletic department sufficient to bring the university within the
scope of Title IX. 543 F. Supp. at 328. The University ofRichmond court rejected the agency's
argument. Id.
543 F. Supp. at 328.
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ing under Title IX's guidelines programs that do not directly receive
federal funds." The benefit approach satisfies both the program-specific
language of Title IX and the broad intent of the law.82 In Grove City Col-
lege v. Bell,8" the Third Circuit applied the benefit theory to Title IX.8'
The Grove City court recognized Title IX as program-specific. 5 The
Third Circuit, however, held that when an institution receives general
federal financial assistance, each program within the institution indirectly
benefits from the aid and the institution as a whole must comply with Title
IX." Grove City College had refused to comply with the Department of
Education's requests for an assurance of compliance with Title IX.8" To
support its refusal to cooperate, the school relied on a program-specific
reading of Title IX and the absence of direct receipt of federal aid by
Grove City College.8
Although Grove City College did not receive direct federal financial
assistance, the school did receive federal aid indirectly through Basic
Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG's) awarded to the College's
students. Adopting a variation of the institutional application of Title
IX, the Grove City court initially noted that neither courts nor commen-
tators have devoted much attention to the resolution of what constitutes
a program or activity under Title IX." The Grove City court then ruled
8 See supra text accompanying notes 55 & 56 (Haffer and Iron Arrow circuit court
decisions both favor benefit theory as a means of applying Title IX to programs which
receive no direct federal aid).
8 See supra text accompanying notes 66-68 (North Haven decision may demand both a
program-specific reading and a broad application of Title IX).
83 687 F.2d 684 (3rd Cir. 1982).
8 Id. at 693.
Id. at 697.
86 Id. at 698; see infra text accompanying note 94 (courts must apply benefit theory to
give Title IX broad scope the law requires).
87 687 F.2d at 689.
Id. at 689-90. As an institution affiliated with the United Presbyterian Church,
Grove City College accepted no direct federal aid in order to maintain the school's
philosophical autonomy. Id. at 689 n.7.
89 Id. at 688-89. Of approximately 2,200 students at Grove City College, 140 received
BEOG's. Id. at 688. Three hundred forty-two students at Grove City received Guaranteed
Student Loans (GSL's). Id. The district court in Grove City, however, ruled that the receipt
of GSL's could not bring the school under Title IX. Id. at 690 n.10. The Third Circuit held
that 20 U.S.C. § 1682, which denies Title IX enforcement authority with respect to a con-
tract of insurance or guarantee, precluded the Department of Education from justifying en-
forcement of Title IX through GSL's, or from terminating GSL's. 687 F.2d at 690.
" Id. at 697-98. The Grove City court noted that the few legal commentators and
courts that have confronted the need to define "program" have recognized that neither the
statutes nor the legislative history resolve the question of what constitutes the program or
activity that Title IX regulates. Id.; see e.g., Todd, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amend-
ments: Preventing Sex Discrimination in Public Schools, 53 TEx. L. REV. 103, 107-13 (1974)
("program" not defined for purposes of Title IX); Comment, Board of Public Instruction v.
Finch: Unwarranted Compromise of Title VI's Termination Sanction, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
1113, 1116-24 (1970) ("program" not defined for purposes of Title VI).
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that when the federal government furnishes indirect or general aid to an
institution, the institution must be the "program" referred to in Title
IX." The Grove City court explained the broad interpretation of pro-
gram by relying on the Supreme Court's decision in North Haven and
the Haffer decision. 2 The Third Circuit reasoned that in North Haven
the Supreme Court implicitly adopted an institutional approach to the
term "program" that is employed in Title IX." Similarly, the Grove City
court relied on the Haffer decision to support both a broad reading of Title
IX and the adoption of the benefit theory application of the law. 4 The
Third Circuit, therefore, held that Grove City College received federal
financial assistance as defined by Title IX, and that the College had to
comply with the Title IX regulations and the Department of Education's
request for an assurance of compliance. 5
Relying primarily on the Grove City opinion,98 the Third Circuit af-
firmed on appeal the district court's holding in Haffer v. Temple Uni-
versity.7 The Haffer court ruled that the Grove City decision rendered
the fact that many athletes at Temple University received BEOG's suffic-
91 687 F.2d at 698.
Id. at 697-98; see supra text accompanying notes 54-56, 66-68 North Haven and Haf-
fer support institutional application of Title IX despite law's program-specific language).
9 687 F.2d at 697.
" Id. at 698. The Grove City court did not mention the apparent institutional approach
that the district judge adopted in Haffer. Id.; see Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531,
533 (E.D. Pa. 1981) affd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982). The Third Circuit instead focused on the
"substantial assistance" analysis of Haffer, which brought the Temple athletic program
under Title IX. Id. at 698; see supra text accompanying notes 54-56 (district court relied par-
tially on substantial assistance justification for applying Title IX to the Temple athletic pro-
gram).
'1 687 F.2d at 698. The Sixth Circuit, however, rejected the Third Circuit's finding in
Grove City that students' receipt of BEOG's places an entire institution under Title IX.
Hillsdale College v. HEW, No. 80-3207, slip op. at 22 (6th Cir., filed Dec. 16, 1982). In
Hillsdale College, the Sixth Circuit faced a factual situation almost identical to that in
Grove City. Hillsdale College, a small school that accepted no direct federal financial
assistance, refused to comply with an HEW assurance of compliance request. Id., slip op. at
2. HEW attempted to cutoff federal assistance, including BEOG's, provided to Hillsdale
students because of Hillsdale's refusal. Id., slip op. at 3-5. The Sixth Circuit, however,
adopted a strict program-specific interpretation of Title IX, supported by the North Haven
decision. Id., slip op. at 12. See supra text accompanying note 66 North Haven Court
holding Title IX program-specific). The Hillsdale College court held that an entire institu-
tion can not be a "program" under Title IX, and that the receipt of BEOG's does not con-
stitute aid to an institution under Title IX. No. 80-3207, slip op. at 19-20. As a result, the
Sixth Circuit ruled that the HEW Title IX regulations were in excess of statutory authority.
Id., slip op. at 20. The Hillsdale College decision, however, fails to mention either the North
Haven's Court's determination of Congressional intent with regard to Title IX, or the
Court's holding that the Title IX employment regulations are valid. See id., slip op. at 12-13.
Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14, 16 n.6 (3rd Cir. 1982) (per curiam). Opinions of
one panel of the Third Circuit are binding on subsequent panels. See Third Cir. Internal
Operating Procedures, Rule VIII(C). However, the judges of the circuit sitting en banc may
overrule a prior circuit decision. Id.
688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
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ient to warrant application of Title IX to Temple's athletic program. 8
The Haffer court also adopted Grove City's benefit theory analysis in ap-
plying Title IX to the Temple athletic department.9 The Third Circuit
ruled that since Temple as an institution received general federal aid,"'0
Title IX governed the school's athletic department. ° The Haffer court
reasoned that the money given to the university frees federal funds that
the university then applies in part to the school's athletic program.' 2
The diametrically opposing decisions of the district court in Uni-
versity of Richmond and the Third Circuit in Grove City and Haffer
reflect the confusion surrounding Title IX and the law's applicability to
collegiate athletic programs.0 3 The Supreme Court's reluctance to issue
a comprehensive decision that will define the scope of Title IX in all
areas has resulted in an inconsistent application of the law to athletic
programs."' Although the University of Richmond court ruled that
North Haven eliminated Title IX's applicability to athletic
departments, 2 the Haffer decisions present valid arguments for the pro-
hibition of gender discrimination in collegiate athletics.' 0 Title IX op-
ponents offer little opposition to the argument that athletic departments
indirectly benefit from general federal aid to universities, other than by
claiming that the benefit does not constitute federal financial assistance
under Title IX."°7
In addition to the confusion that the inconsistent application of Title
IX creates, the current Administration's reluctance and inability to en-
force Title IX regulations clouds the future of women's athletics. The
00 Id. at 16.
Id. at 16-17.
30 See Haffer, 524 F. Supp. at 533. Temple receives more than 19 million dollars an-
nually in federal aid. Id.
lo, 688 F.2d at 16-17. -
102 Id.
103 See supra text accompanying notes 56, 78 & 98-101 (courts not consistent in applying
Title IX to athletic programs).
.0. See infra note 105 (current confusion over Title IX's application to athletic programs
similar to confusion over the law's application to employment discrimination prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in North Haven).
'1 The current inconsistent application of Title IX to athletic programs is similar to the
law's inconsistent application in the area of gender discrimination in employment under Ti-
tle IX prior to North Haven. Id. See supra note 63 (courts differ on Title IX's application to
employment discrimination).
10 524 F. Supp. at 540; 688 F.2d at 16-17; see supra text accompanying notes 54-56
(athletic departments benefit from general federal financial assistance sufficiently to sub-
ject them to Title IX). One of the most compelling arguments advanced by the district court
in Haffer in favor of an institutional approach to Title IX is that if courts apply the law on a
program-specific basis, a university could use federal money to support some programs in
compliance with Title IX, transfer the university's general funds into the budgets of other
programs, and discriminate freely in those programs. 524 F. Supp. at 539.
"' University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 328 (E.D. Va. 1982); see also supra
notes 73-80 (discussing University of Richmond).
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Department of Education's decision not to appeal the University of Rich-
mond case has caused Title IX proponents to question the Administra-
tion's dedication to equal opportunity in collegiate athletics."8 Faced
with the proposition of a program-specific scope of Title IX, and an Ad-
ministration that will not challenge the limitation, women athletes must
depend in the future on a benefit theory application of Title IX to gain
equality in intercollegiate athletics. 9 The benefit theory remains viable
in light of the Grove City and Haffer decisions. 0
If courts ultimately hold that the benefit theory is merely a disguised
institutional justification for Title IX's application,' however, Title IX
proponents will have to test other approaches in an attempt to justify
the law's continuing influence on college athletic programs. Future ef-
forts to gain equality in collegiate athletics through Title IX may focus
on attempts to find direct federal assistance to athletic programs
through federal grants to athletes."' Beyond Title IX, female athletes
may attempt in the future to seek equality through civil rights actions."3
The unsuccessful outcome of these cases in the past, however, indicates
that reliance on Title IX arguments is the best avenue for actions
against discriminating athletic departments at the present time."' Until
"' Wash. Post, Sept. 9, 1982, at A23, col. 1. According to Title IX proponents, the
government's decision not to appeal the University of Richmond case was a major setback
to civil rights advancement and an indication that the Reagan administration would not en-
force Title IX. Id. The decision not to appeal University of Richmond was viewed as a mark
against the administration's commitment to Title IX enforcement. Id.
'"' See supra text accompanying note 66 (North Haven decision holds Title IX to be
program-specific).
"I See supra text accompanying notes 90-92; 98-102 (post-North Haven courts apply Ti-
tle IX to college athletic programs).
' See University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 328 (E.D. Va. 1982) (benefit
theory viewed merely as modified institutional approach); see also supra notes 73-80
(discussing University of Richmond).
"' See supra text accompanying note 89 (receipt of BEOG's by Grove City College
athletes sufficient to bring school's athletic program within Title IX); see also Haffer v.
Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14, 16 (3d Cir. 1982). The Third Circuit in Haffer first relied upon the
receipt of federal grants by Temple's athletes as the means by which Title IX was applied to
Temple's athletic program. Id. The University of Richmond court, however, rejected the
receipt of grants as a basis for applying Title IX. University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F.
Supp. 321, 328-30 (E.D. Va. 1982).
1,' Athletes have previously instituted actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) of the Civil
Rights Act as parties seeking equality in athletic programs. The actions have been suc-
cessful when seeking to establish sports programs for a certain gender where none existed
before the action. See Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292, 1295 (8th Cir.
1973) (female high school student entitled under Civil Rights Act to participate in non-
contact sports). The courts have refused to find, however, that § 1983 demands anything
more than the opportunity to participate. See Fluitt v. University of Nebraska, 489 F. Supp.
1194, 1196 (D. Neb. 1980) (student not denied civil rights where afforded opportunity to par-
ticipate in intercollegiate sport even though more opportunities were provided to the op-
posite sex).
"' See supra note 113 (courts unwilling to apply civil rights arguments to athletic pro-
grams beyond basic right to participate).
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the Supreme Court decides a case that directly concerns Title IX's ap-
plication to collegiate athletic programs, the continued growth of
women's sports will remain in doubt.
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